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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE 
INVESTORS; and CITIBANK, N.A., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a 
limited partnership; MOUNTAIN 
SPRINGS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
MOUNTAIN SPRINGS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a California corpo-
ration; F. D. ASHDOWN and 
ALFRETTA ASHDOWN, Trustees; 
FMA LEASING COMPANY; DUNCAN 
ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC.; HOLT-
WITMER INTERIORS, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents-
Case No. 15696 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, BLAND BROS., INC. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which the respondents sought 
foreclosure against real property known as the Lakeview Terrace 
Subdivision in Davis County, Utah, pursuant to mechanic's liens, 
and appellant sought foreclosure against said property upon the 
basis of a Trust Deed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the !-lotions for Summary Judg-
ment of the respondents, adjudging that they had first priority 
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against said subdivision in the total sum of $44,732.86 and 
adjudging that appellant had second priority against said 
property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Summary 
Judgment awarding respondents priority in the sum of $44,732.86. 
Respondent, Bland. Bros., Inc., seeks to have the ruling of the 
lower court sustained on appeal, and seeks to have the appeal 
dismissed as being moot and premature. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In large measure, the appellant's rather lengthy State-
ment of Facts is not supported by the record. Appellant appeals 
from a Summary Judgment (R.618) in favor of respondents. There 
was no evidentiary hearing, and thus there is no "evidence" on 
the question of the location, extent and other circumstances of 
the respondents' work on the project. Appellant itself admits 
this work to a considerable extent, and che lower court undoubt-
edly felt that those admissions, together with the deposition 
referred to hereafter,were sufficient for its ruling. If the 
Supreme Court feels that the location, extent and circumstances 
of respondents' work have not been sufficiently developed, then 
of course a trial will be required. 
The sole issue raised by appellant's brief is Nhether 
or not the lower court committed error in granting the respondents 
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a first priority on the basis of labor and materials furnished 
and performed by respondent, Child Bros., Inc., commencing on 
November 15, 1973, which was approximately three months prior to 
the recording of appellant's Trust Deed on the 19th day of Feb-
ruary, 1974. All facts dealing with other subjects are irrele-
vant. It should also be noted that the deposition of Eugene 
Child, a principal in the defendant, 
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Child Bros., Inc., was published at the hearing on the 
respective motions for Summary Judgment (Tr.75). Respondent, 
Bland Bros., Inc., further claims that the appeal is moot and 
should therefore be dismissed, and facts relating to that claim 
will be briefly set forth. 
In appellant's brief at page 8, appellant admits that 
respondent, Child Bros., Inc., "laid water line and sewer pipe 
for the subdivision, commencing its first work on November 15, 
1973." In the brief of appellant (plaintiff below) in support 
of his motion for summary judgment, the admission is made (R.SlOI: 
"The Defendant, Child Bros., Inc., was employed by the original 
owner, C. N. Zundel and Associates, to provide sanitary sewer, 
storm drain and water system for the Lakeview Terrace Subdivisio.~. 
The first work was performed on November 15, 1973." In that sa.'ne 
brief, appellant admits (R. 511) that respondent, Bland Bros., Inc., 
"furnished landscaping services on the common areas of Phase l 
(the first ten townhouse units) of Lakeview Terrace, a Planned 
Unit Development." And again in said brief (R. 514) appellant 
admits: "The lien claimant, Bland Bros. Inc., is a landscaper 
who provided landscaping including sprinkler system and related 
i terns in the common area of Lakeview Terrace, Phase Two·: Appellan: 
thus concedes that respondent, Bland Bros., Inc., perfo~ed ser-
vices in both Phase l and Phase 2 of Lakeview Terrace, Nhich 
constitute a substantial part of the subdivision. The re~ord 
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nowhere shows that that is the only area in which Bland Bros., 
Inc., performed services. Likewise the record does not disclose 
that the other lien claimants performed services exclusively in 
that area, although appellant so asserts. Eugene Child, in his 
deposition at page 55, stated that a lot of his work pertained 
to the entire subdivision. He stated it in the following phrase: 
"But a lot of it pertained to the whole project there." 
In appellant's brief, he admits that the original owner 
of the subdivision was a limited partnership known as C. N. Zundel 
and Associates (see page 1 of appellant's brief). On page 2 of 
said brief the appellant admits that the property was conveyed by 
the limited partnership to the defendant, Mountain Springs Con-
struction Company, a Utah corporation, and that "The stockholders 
of Mountain Springs were the same individuals (with the exception 
of c. N. Zundel) as the limited partners , .. " 
The amounts of the liens, including interest and attor-
neys' fees of the various respondents are conceded by the appellant 
(see page 5 of appellant's brief). 
On December 8, 1977, at a hearing in this matter before 
the lower court, stipulation was entered into by the parties, and 
a Minute Entry for that date states the following (R.443): 
"Counsel and parties have met and reached stipula-
tions which are stated into the record. Plaintiff will 
take a decree of foreclosure for one million nine hundred 
thousand dollars, and there will be no deficiency judgment 
taken. Plaintiff waives the six percent penalty figure on 
redemption and will pay thirty thousand more for liens, 
plus anything necessary for maintenance and repair." 
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See ~1inute Entry of Dec. 12, 1977, to the same effect (R.453). 
The Motions for Summary Judgment were set for hearing for the 
12th of January, 1978, and the matter was set for trial for 
February 1, 1978. Thus, in short, appellant agreed to accept 
one million nine hundred thousand dollars, take no deficiency 
judgment, and the matter of priority between the appellant and 
respondents was reserved. Thereafter on December 20, 1978, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R.481) and a Judgment and 
(R. 637). 
Decree of Foreclosure (R.488) and an Order of Sale were entered. 
In the Conclusions of Law (R.485), it states: 
"4. Plaintiffs have Stipulated in open court that 
they shall bid only the sum of one million nine hundred 
thousand for saig-property and take no deficiency judrnent 
against the defendant, Mountain Springs Construction Com-
pany nor against any of the individual guarantors." 
(emphasis added.) 
In the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (R.489), 
it states: 
"The priority of' the mechanic's and materialmen's 
liens is reserved for future determination and shall be 
set forth in a supplemental Judgment and Decree of Fore-
closure to be entered prior to Sheriff's Sale." 
and again it states: 
. . that the proceeds of sale be applied in 
payment of the sheriff's cost of sale and thereafter 
to the parties in accordance with the priority to be 
determined by the court; 
The aforesaid Order of Sale set the Sheriff's Sale for January 
19, 1978. The ruling on the ~lotions for Summary Judgment did 
not take place until January 24, 1978. On January 16, 1973, thE 
trial judge entered a Memorandum Decision in which he ordered 
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that the sale should take place on January 19, 1978, as scheduled, 
but ordered that: 
the proceeds from said sale be submitted 
immediately to the Court to be held until such time as 
a decision is made in the entire matter after the sub-
mission of Briefs, due as previously ordered by the 
Court,on January 23, 1978." (R.569} 
The Sheriff's Sale took place on January 19th and the appellant 
bid for the property one million nine hundred thousand dollars 
(R. 642}. 
On January 24, 1978, the Court entered a Memorandum 
Decision awarding the respondents first priority over the appel-
!ant, and that ruling encompassed total liens in the amount of 
$37,397.42. (R.614} 
The aforesaid Memorandum Decision was entered as a 
final order entitled Order Granting Summary Judgment and Order 
Amending Certificate of Sale on February 1, 1978. (R.618} 
In addition to awarding the respondents the total judgments of 
$37,397.42, at the request of the appellant, the Sheriff's Certi-
ficate of Sale was amended to show that plaintiff's bid for the 
property is the sum of $1,937,397.42 (R.619}. The said Order 
was prepared by the appellant, who admitted in a prior hearing 
in this matter before the Supreme Court that the amendment was at 
his request. By Order entered on February 16, 1978, at the request 
of the appellant (P.628), b1e appellant's bid was amended again, 
and that Order states: 
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"It is ordered that the Sheriff's certificate of 
Sale shall be amended to show that plaintiff's bid for 
the property is the sum of $1,944,732.86." 
This amendment was requested to cover the award of a further lie~ 
to Holt-Witmer Interiors, Inc. 
On February 22, 1978, an Amended Order of Decision was 
entered, which states in part: 
"It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that 
the material and labor liens duly and adequately filed 
are as follows: Duncan Electric Company in the sum of 
$4,310.70; Robert J. Wardrop, in the sum of $2,367.37; 
Countertop Shop, Inc., $790.43; Max D. Scheel, $729.53; 
Ronald Graham Tile Company, $3,460.40; Bland Bros., Inc., 
$12,289.47; Child Bros., Inc., $13,450.52; Holt-Witmer 
Interiors, Inc., $7,335.44; said amount being $44,732.86. 
"Based upon the Amended Order executed by the above-
entitled Court, the amount required to be paid in order 
for redemption of the property shall be $1,944,732.86. 
All other portions of the prior orders and decisions 
shall remain in full force and effect, except as modi-
fied herein." (R.629-630) 
On February 24, 1978, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal 
appealing from the Order of February l, 1978. No appeal was ta:<e:. 
from the Order of February 22, 1978. (R.63l) 
Appellant has paid no sum \.,'hatever to the Sheriff of 
Davis County, and no sum has been paid into the court pursuant :c 
the aforesaid foreclosure sales. During the redemption period, 
appellant's counsel indicated numerous time to counsel for this 
respondent that a redemption appeared likely which would provide 
sufficient funds to pay appellant and responden~s. 
possibility did not materialize, and prior to the expiration o: 
the redemption period, this respondent filed a Pet1tion ~1th 
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lower court to Vacate the Sheriff's Sale by reason of the failure 
of the appellant to pay the amount bid by him, to-wit, $1,944,732.86. 
The Court stated that it was without jurisdiction in view of the 
instant appeal and denied the motion, but on the lower Court's own 
motion required the plaintiff to file a supersedeas bond covering 
the lien claimants. The refusal to grant that motion will be the 
subject of another appeal by this respondent at least. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE MECHANIC'S LIEN OF RESPONDENT, BLAND BROS .. , INC. IS 
ENTITLED TO RELATE BACK TO THE INITIAL WORK DONE 
BY RESPONDENT, CHILD BROS., INC, 
Two provisions of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Law a9pear to 
be determinative of this issue. Section 38-1-10, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, provides: 
"The liens for work and labor done or material 
furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an 
equal footing; regardless of the date of filing the 
notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time 
of performing such work and labor or furnishing such 
material." 
Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back 
to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the 
structure or improvement, and shall have priority over 
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have 
have attached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground; also over any 
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien 
holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the 
time the building, structure or improvement was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
the ground." 
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It thus appears that all who furnish work and materi~s 
on a project have the same priority which dates back to the com-
mencement of the first work by the first laborer or supplier of 
materials. In this case, the first work was commenced by Child 
Bros., Inc., on November 15, 1973, and that is the date of pri-
ority for all of the respondents. 
Appellant attempts to circumvent this result by what 
appears to be a misapplication of the holding in Western Mortgage 
424 P2d 437. I That case involved a single lot in a subdivision, 
and the Supreme Court of Utah held that the mechanic's lien 
claimants who had furnished labor and materials on the structure 
on that single lot were not entitled to tack on for priority pur-
poses to work which was done elsewhere in the subdivision so as 
to take priority over a construction mortgage lender who had 
loaned on that specific lot. The Supreme Court based its opinion 
upon the issue of notice stating: 
"The problem is one of notice. The presence of 
materials on the building site or evidence on the ground 
that work has commenced on a structure or preparatory 
thereto is notice to all the world that liens may have 
attached. However, the off-site construction in devel-
oping the subdivision for building sites would not 
necessarily bring to the attention of a lender that 
someone is claiming a lien on a particular lot in 
the subdivision." 
In the instant case, ~e are not deal1ng w1th a lender 
who has loaned on one single lot, nor even on a series of lots, 
and who, therefore, might not be on notice as to the existence 
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of prior work. In the instant case, the initial work by respon-
dent, Child Bros., Inc., applied to the entire subdivision, and 
the mortgage of the appellant is a blanket mortgage covering the 
entire subdivision. There is therefore no question that the 
appellant was on notice of the work performed by respondent, Child 
Bros., Inc. Furthermore the work performed by respondents was not 
limited to one single lot, but rather was labor performed, even 
by appellant's own admission, on a very sizeable portion of the 
subdivision. Appellant admits that work was performed on Phases 
1 and 2. However the record does not disclose that the work of 
respondents did not take place on even a broader area than is 
admitted by the appellant. So in this case we have the iabor of 
of the respondents being performed on a substantial area, including 
the same area in which the respondent, Child Bros., Inc., performed 
its labor. On the other hand, in the Western Mortgage case, the 
mechanic's lien claimant's labor was performed in a different ~rea 
than that in which the initial work was performed, and in fact the 
Supreme Court designates it as "off-site". The instant case there-
fore does not deal with off-site work because the labor was per-
formed by this respondent and by Child Bros., Inc., on the same 
site. This result is not changed even if the facts should show 
that the Child Bros., Inc., performed some work in areas in which 
this respondent did not venture. The fact nevertheless remains 
they all did work in a substantial area together. 
Although the appellant does not appear to rely heavily 
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thereon, he does make reference to the fact that there were two 
different owners of the property. We respectfully submit that 
that should make no difference in the result in this case. First 
of all, it appears that this so-called change of ownership was 
largely a technical one because substantially the same persons 
remained involved in both the limited partnership and in the 
so-called corporation. Furthermore, the benefits of the Meehan-
ic's Lien Law should not be denied the mechanic's lien claimants 
by virtue of change in ownership. It would appear that the rights 
of the mechanic's lien claimants should not be destroyed by the 
simple expedient of one owner transferring the property to another 
during construction. Those who bestow honest and diligent labor 
on a property should not be deprived of the benefits of the 
Mechanic's Lien Law by such a device as a transfer during con-
struction from one owner to another. That would appear to be 
especially so where the transfer is one of form rather than sub-
stance. It should be noted that the language of the Utah Mechanic': 
Lien Law states that t..'le lien attaches to the real property and is 
thus a right in rem. See Section 38-l-3, Utah Code Annoted, 1953. 
It should also be noted that just as appellant's mortgage was a 
blanket mortgage covering the entire tract "physically", it also 
covered the entire project "financially". That is to say, there 
were not separate loan agreements :or dif:'erent ;:ohases o:: <::"1e ?e-
ject. The labor of Child Bros. and the other respondents co';ered 
the same physical area and ·were all perfor:-:1ed iJUrsuant to fin'mcl~ 0 
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from the same lender, to-wit, the appellant. The change in 
form of ownership from limited partnership to corporation can-
not alter the foregoing facts, particularly where substantially 
the same personnel are involved. 
The case of Aladdin Heating v. Trustees of the Central 
States, 563 P2d 82 (1977), cited in appellant's brief, is not in 
point because it deals with the situation where there are no 
"visible signs of construction to inform prospective lenders 
inspecting the premises that liens had attached." (Page 84) 
In the instant case, such visible signs were admittedly on the 
property as the result of the work of Child Bros. 
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Again, although appellant does not appear to rely 
heavily thereon, he does make reference to the fact that Child 
Bros., Inc., at one time released its lien. We think that that 
has no significance whatever in this case. It is undisputed that 
Child Bros., Inc., performed its initial labor on the property 
commencing November 15, 1973. It is also undisputed that Child 
Bros., Inc., performed other services on the premises at other 
times subsequent to November 15, 1973. It should be noted, how-
ever, that even prior to the aforesaid purported release of Child 
(R. 4 62) 
Bros.' lien which took place on June 22, 1976,/Bland Bros., Inc., 
began March 8, 1976, and 
had already completed its labor, which/was completed on May 1, 
1976 (R.508). Thus Bland Bros., Inc., had fully performed its 
work two months prior to any release of mortgage by Child Bros., 
Inc. However, even if Bland Bros., Inc., had performed its work 
after Child Bros., Inc., had released their lien, it would appear 
that they would still be entitled to the same priority. 
Further, in this connection,we cite to the Court the 
case of Boise Cascade v. Stephens, 572 P2d 1380 (Utah-1977) .. In 
that case the court held that where a materialman furnished his 
materials and then signed a release of lien, and then thereafter 
furnished further materials, that the priority date of the seconc 
series dates back to the date of the first delivery, even though 
there has been an intervening lien celease. That being the ::;ase, 
it would appear to be clear that the labor of Bland Bros., Inc., 
performed prior even to such release, would certainly relate back 
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to the date of the first delivery of labor and materials on the 
subdivision by Child Bros., Inc., to-wit, on November 15, 1973. 
In truth, what this case really boils down to is that 
appellant erroneously assumed some risk in releasing its first mort-
gage (Trust Deed). That first Trust Deed was recorded August 1, 
1973 (two and one-half months before Child Bros., Inc., commenced 
work) . Appellant released that Trust Deed and recorded a new one 
on February 19, 1974. By doing so, they forfeited their first 
priority. They were not required to release that first Trust 
Deed because the February 1974 transaction was just a refinancing 
with the same mortgagor, to-wit, the Zundel Limited Partnership. 
The assigr~ent to Mountain Springs did not take place until 1975 
(see page 2 of appellant's brief). Appellent attempts now to 
avoid the consequences of that error by endeavoring to come within 
the ruling in Western Mortgage, supra. That case d~es not cover 
the instant fact situation and indeed in fairness to subcontrac-
tors, the rule of that case should not be extended to cover a 
situation where the lender's Trust Deed covers the entire tract 
and the lender is on notice of all work performed anywhere on the 
same tract. Respondents seek only to recover for materials and 
labor which they had actually and admittedly furnished on the 
project. Theyshould not be denied a just recovery where the 
appellant was on notice of labor on the tract at the time it 
recorded its Trust Deed in February 1974. 
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POINT II. THE APPEAL IS MOOT. 
The appellant agreed by stipulation to accept the sum 
of $1,900,000 even though it claimed that the total amount owing 
to it was in excess of that sum. Pursuant thereto, the appellant 
agreed to bid only that sum. In the summary to appellant's brief, 
it states (page 12) : 
"As stated to this court on the argument May 15, 
1978, concerning respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal, 
plaintiff is attempting to obtain payment by redemption 
from several prospective buyers for $1,900,000 net to 
it, but it is not willing to sell for less than 
$1,944,732.86 principal. The additional $44,732.86 
will be paid to the junior lien claimants. If a 
developer-investor pays this amount during the period 
of redemption, the appeal will become moot." 
This is an honorable admission and in keeping with the initial 
stipulation of the parties on December 8, 1977. As heretofore 
noted, the appellant agreed not to take a deficiency and is there-
fore by stipulation entitled at best to $1,900,000. It was based 
upon that agreement that the parties to this action withdrew thei: 
claims against the appellant. Although the appellant only bid 
$1,900,000 initially at the Sheriff's Sale, at his own request, 
that bid was amended to reflect that it bid $1,944,732.86 for the 
property. The appellant was not compelled to request that amend-
ment to the bidding and was indeed entitled to rely on its bid of 
$1,900,000 as it '.vas in keeping •.vith its stipulation. The :>poelL:.: 
could then have appealed the question of priority to the Suore~e 
Court, presumably to have the matter of priorities tested on 
appeal. 
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The appellant, however, chose not to follow that course 
of action. The appellant bid for the property $1,944,732.86 and in 
so doing has rendered the appeal moot because, having bid that 
sum, the appellant is required to pay that sum to the Sheriff 
pursuant to Rule 69(e) (4) which states: 
"Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; 
and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by 
him for the property struck off to him at a sale under 
execution, the officer may again sell the property at 
any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is 
occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in 
addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a 
contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. 
When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, 
in his discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of 
such person." 
Thus the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and i~ fact the 
Order of the Court entered January 16, 1978, (R.568) required 
that the purchaser at the sale pay the money to the Sheriff and 
from there, into court. Appellant, having bid $1,944,732.86, 
is required to pay that sum to the Sheriff. Inasmuch as the 
first priority claimants only amount to $44,732.86, no one would 
object to appellant's not paying the $1,900,000 to which he would 
be entitled in his position of second priority, but certainly is 
obligated to pay the $44,732.86 which he actually bid. As a pur-
chaser at the Sheriff's Sale, the appellant is not entitled to 
any privileges to which any other purchaser would not be entitled. 
Any third person,having bid at the sale, would be required to pay 
in the full amount, and appellant is likewise required to pay in 
the full amount, at least to the extent of those having priority 
over the bidder. 
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Appellant, having bid that sum in, and saic'l. sum being sufficient 
to pay the first and second priorities, we respectfully submit 
that the appeal is moot. Even if the Supreme Court should 
reverse the lower court and adjudge that the appellant is entitled 
to first priority and the respondents entitled to second priority, 
having agreed to accept $1,900,000, appellant is only entitledto 
that sum, and the respondents, even in a position of second prior-
ity, would be entitled to the excess of the bid made, to-wit, 
$44,732.86. Therefore, no matter how the Supreme Court rules, 
there has been sufficient bid to pay both the first priority 
and the second priority. 
On the last page of appellant's brief, it is conceded 
that if, during the redemption period, a redemption for the sum 
of $1,944,732.86 is obtained, that "The additional $44,732.86 
will be paid to the junior lien claimants." Appellant goes on 
to say however that "if the redemption period expires, plaintiffs 
are entitled to the property without obligation to pay the liens 
which should be determined to be junior and subordinate to the 
first Trust Deed." 
The last sentence is not in accord with the stipulation 
of December 8, 1977, and furthermore until the bid price of 
$1,944,732.86 is actually paid, there can be no expiration of 
the redemption period. Appellant is not entitled to the beneflc 
of a termination of the redemption period where it has never pal~ 
for the property. Before the so-called expiration of the redempti21 
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including Bland Bros., Inc., 
several of the respondents/petitioned the lower court 
to vacate the purported Sheriff's Sale. The Court declined to 
do that on the belief that it lacked jurisdiction inasmuch as 
this appeal was pending. Failure to grant that relief will be 
appealed and presented to this Court in due course. 
In this matter, the respondent, Bland Bros., Inc., 
filed a Petition with the Supreme Court to Dismiss the Appeal 
of the appellant on the basis that the appellant had (1) stipu-
lated to judgment, and (2) accepted the benefits of the judgment 
and could not therefore appeal therefrom. Cases cited in support 
of this position were: Cornia vs. Cornia, 80 Ut 486, 15 P2d 631 
(1932), and Dawson vs. Board of Education of Weber County, 118 Ut 
452, 222 P2d 590 (1950). That matter was heard before the Supreme 
Court on briefs submitted by the parties. The Court denied the 
Motion, and respondent will not repeat the arguments at this 
point. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court did not announce any reasons 
for denying the Motions, and one can perhaps assume that the said 
Motions were denied to enable the Court to become more fully aware 
of the circumstances of the appeal. This respondent will, there-
fore, adopt that Motion and the grounds asserted therefor at 
this point in the brief. It would appear that the arguments 
there asserted are even more compelling at this point inasmuch 
as the appellant has now actually obtained a Sheriff's Deed to 
the property, never having paid a single ~ime of the amount bid 
by appellant at the Sheriff's Sale. Appellant thus has the full 
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fruits of the Judgment and the Sheriff's Sale without ever 
having paid the amount bid. Further, appellant's counsel has 
stated that his client will not now accept $1,944,732.86 for 
the property. When appellant bid that sum, we must assume that 
appellant felt that it was getting value for its money, or it 
would not have made that bid. Appellant admits that respondents 
were entitled to the $44,732.86 if a third party had bid that soo, 
but claims that respondents are not entitled to it where the 
appellant bid that sum. That proposition flies in the face of 
the letter and the spirit of the stipulation of December 8, 1977, 
expecially where appellant now has the property and refuses to 
sell it for the sum of $1,944,732.86. 
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POINT III. THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS PREMATURE AND OUT OF TIME. 
(R. 631) 
In Appellant's Notice of Appeal,/he appeals from the 
"Order Granting Summary Judgment and Order Amending Certificate 
of Sale in favor of the defendant-lien claimants Duncan Electric 
Supply, Robert J. Wardrop, Countertop Shop, Inc., Max D. Scheel, 
Ronald Graham Tile Co., Bland Bros., Inc., and Child Bros., Inc., 
which Order granted the lien claimants priority over plaintiffs • 
Trust Deed lien. " The only order in the file bearing that heading 
and relating to those defendants is the Order of the Court entered 
(R.618) 
on February 1, 1978.; That Order, however, did not adjudge the pri-
ority of defendant, Holt-Witmer Interiors, and the prior:i.ty of 
that defendant was adjudged and included in the Amended Order and 
Decision of the Court entered February 22, 1978 (R.629). There 
is a rather indefinite reference to Holt-Witmer in an Motion and 
Order of February 16, 1978 (R.627-628). Furthermore, an Order 
dismissing Crossclaims against C. N. Zundel and Associates and 
C. N. Zundel, with prejudice, was entered on February 7, 1978, 
(R.633-635) and the final order in the file was entered on March 6, 
1978, which dismissed certain crossclaims and counterclaims, and 
continued certain crossclaims and counterclaims without date. (R.645) 
It thus appears that until the adjudication regarding 
Holt-Witmer, which was entered February 22, 1978, the case was 
still pending in the lower court and prior orders were not final, 
including the Order of February l, 1978. Not being final, said 
. -
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Orders were not appealable. In fact it appears that at least 
until March 6, 1978, the matter was still pending in the lower 
court, and no prior orders were final and appealable. The Court 
nowhere made the finding required by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that "there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment". It would 
thus appectr that at least until March 6, 1978, substantial issues 
remained to be decided, and therefore no prior orders were final. 
Even the matter of the lien claimants was not determined totally 
until the Order of February 22, 1978. It thus appears that the 
attempt of appellant to appeal from the February l, 1978, was 
abortive. Even if the Order of February 22, 1978, is deemed final, 
it was not appealed from by the appellant. It thus appears ines-
capable that where at least four separate orders were entered after 
February l, 1978, that Order cannot be deemed a final order and 
one which is appealable to this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Bland Bros., Inc., respectfully submits 
that the decision of the lower court should be affirmed, or in 
the alternative, the appeal should be dismissed as being moot 
and premature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS ~-
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Bland Bros., Inc. 
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